A High Stakes Gamble in North Las Vegas by Lang, Robert E.
Publications Lincy Institute 
5-2012 
A High Stakes Gamble in North Las Vegas 
Robert E. Lang 
Brookings Mountain West, robert.lang@unlv.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/lincy_publications 
 Part of the Economics Commons, Education Commons, and the Political Science Commons 
Repository Citation 
Lang, R. E. (2012). A High Stakes Gamble in North Las Vegas. The Lincy Institute Issue Brief(1), 1-7. 
Available at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/lincy_publications/9 
This Report is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV 
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Report in any way that is permitted by the 
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from 
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself. 
 
This Report has been accepted for inclusion in Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital 




THE	LINCY	INSTITUTE		 	 	 	 	 	 	 			ISSUES	BRIEF	NO.1	
	
	May	2012		
	
A	High	Stakes	Gamble	in	North	Las	Vegas		
	
BY	ROBERT	E.	LANG,	Ph.D.	
	
Abstract	
The	City	of	North	Las	Vegas,	operating	in	the	shadow	of	the	Las	Vegas	Strip,	one	of	the	world’s	most	
iconic	urban	settings,	faces	a	series	of	financial	and	political	challenges	that	threaten	its	ability	to	
perform	basic	municipal	services.	This	paper	explores	how	North	Las	Vegas	reached	the	edge	of	
insolvency,	the	implications	for	North	Las	Vegas	and	the	surrounding	municipalities	of	Las	Vegas,	
Henderson,	and	unincorporated	Clark	County,	and	the	path	forward	in	the	face	of	unprecedented	
economic	and	political	turmoil.	
The	Set	Up:	How	Did	North	Las	Vegas	
Reach	the	Edge	of	Insolvency?	
In	my	recent	book	Boomburbs:	The	Rise	of	
America’s	Accidental	Cities,	I	refer	to	North	
Las	Vegas	as	having	a	“Rodney	Dangerfield	
complex,”	noting	that	the	city	receives	little	or	
no	respect	as	a	growing	urban	center,	both	
locally	and	across	the	nation.1	The	remark	
refers	to	the	way	former	North	Las	Vegas	
mayor	Michael	Montandon	was	treated	by	
then	mayor	of	Salt	Lake	City	Rocky	Anderson	
at	a	meeting	of	the	National	League	of	Cities.		
Montandon	approached	Anderson	to	share	
his	experiences	in	managing	a	big	city.		The	
Salt	Lake	City	mayor	was	incredulous	at	any	
comparison	with	North	Las	Vegas.		Anderson	
implied	that	he	ran	a	real	city	and	that	North	
Las	Vegas	was	a	suburb.		Yet,	as	I	noted	in	
Boomburbs,	North	Las	Vegas	exceeds	Salt	
Lake	City	in	population—and	it	also	contains	
more	minorities	and	foreign	born	residents	
and	sustains	greater	concentrated	poverty.		
Although	seen	by	some	distant	observers	as	a	
“suburb,”	North	Las	Vegas	maintains	a	scale	
and	demographic	composition	that	makes	it		
essentially	urban	in	character.	However,	
notwithstanding	its	urban	elements,	North	
Las	Vegas	lacks	a	big	city	downtown—a	
typical	condition	in	most	Boomburbs	
including	Henderson,	Nevada.				
North	Las	Vegas	may	have	urban	challenges,	
but	it	lacks	most	urban	assets—such	as	a	
large	commercial	sector—to	help	mitigate	its	
fiscal	problems.		This	mismatch	between	
needs	and	resources	produces	a	segregated	
city	with	low	fiscal	capacity.		In	2002,	Myron	
Orfield	published	Metropolitics	for	the	
Brookings	Institution	Press,	a	work	that	
examined	the	fiscal	capacity	for	all	
jurisdictions	in	the	top	25	U.S.	metropolitan	
areas.2	While	the	Las	Vegas	metropolitan		
area	was	not	part	of	the	study,	the	report’s	
findings	are	highly	relevant.		Orfield	
identified	a	significant	disparity	between	
jurisdictions	in	their	tax	capacity	per	capita	
and	the	share	of	dependent	residents.		Based	
on	its	demographics	and	modest	business	
development,	North	Las	Vegas	matches		
the	profile	for	an	“at	risk,	segregated”	
jurisdiction.		According	to	Orfield,	such	places		
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have	the	lowest	“fiscal	capacity”	and	are	at	
risk	for	failure	and	decline.3	
Former	Mayor	Montandon	specifically	
addressed	North	Las	Vegas’	precarious	fiscal	
situation	in	response	to	observations	that	
North	Las	Vegas,	once	the	fastest	growing	U.S.	
city	above	100,000	residents,	also	
experienced	notable	decline	in	the	areas	east	
of	Interstate	15.	Montandon	noted	that	North	
Las	Vegas	was	in	a	race	to	build	out	the	new	
sections	of	the	city	with	mostly	upscale	
master	planned	communities	in	an	effort	to	
offset	the	burden	of	poverty	in	the	older	parts	
of	town.		He	was	also	concerned	that	older	
sections	of	the	city	were	costly	to	administer	
because	they	were	“fee	simple”	and	functions	
such	as	code	enforcement	were	the	
responsibility	of	the	city	as	opposed	to	the	
volunteers	that	provide	this	same	function	in	
master	planned	communities.4	
	
North	Las	Vegas,	like	so	many	
Boomburbs,	has	both	rich	and	poor	
sections.		The	divide	here	is	I‐15,	which	
runs	north	out	of	Las	Vegas	and	splits	the	
city	in	two.		The	largely	built‐out	area	east	
of	I‐15	is	low	income	and	composes	about	
a	third	of	North	Las	Vegas.		The	still‐
booming	space	west	of	I‐15	is	higher	
income	and	accounts	for	about	two‐thirds	
of	the	city…New	projects	approved	in	the	
new	parts	of	North	Las	Vegas	are	more	
upscale	than	the	existing	neighborhoods	
in	the	east.		The	mayor	argues	that	the	
city	needs	to	do	this	to	balance	the	city’s	
income,	but	the	more	pressing	issue	for	
Montandon	is	that	North	Las	Vegas’s	east	
neighborhoods	create	enormous	costs	in	
code	enforcement.		The	problem	is	that	
the	east	side	of	the	city	has	few	
homeowners	associations	to	manage	
relations	between	feuding	neighbors	and	
local	government	must	be	brought	in	to	
settle	disputes.		This	requires	hiring	
municipal	employees	to	do	the	settling,	
and	that	raises	taxes.5	
It	is	important	to	note	that	there	are	
distressed	areas	in	neighboring	Las	Vegas,	
Henderson,	and	unincorporated	Clark	County.			
However,	the	share	of	such	neighborhoods	
relative	to	wealthier	sections	and	business	
centers	is	greater	in	North	Las	Vegas,	
resulting	in	less	resources	and	tax	capacity	
per	capita.		In	the	last	decade,	North	Las	
Vegas	addressed	this	mismatch	via	a	
“builders’	solution,”	where	most	growth	was	
concentrated	in	more	affluent	master‐
planned	communities	such	as	Aliante	(a	
project	that	includes	housing,	retail,	and	a	
Station’s	Casino).		Yet	late	in	the	decade,	as	
North	Las	Vegas	quickly	added	middle	and	
upper	income	households,	the	real	estate	
bubble	burst	and	reversed	the	growth	
pattern.			
North	Las	Vegas	soon	found	itself	mired	in	
the	deepest	economic	downturn	since	the	
Great	Depression,	and	at	ground	zero	for	the	
nation’s	home	foreclosure	crisis.		The	once	
promising	Aliante	master	planned	community	
saw	its	prices	fall	to	below	half	their	2006	
peak	and	the	Station’s	Casino	file	for	
bankruptcy	in	2009.		Overall,	the	city’s	tax	
base	shriveled	as	real	estate	values	fell	65	
percent	from	their	peak.		Again,	this	occurred	
in	a	city	that	began	the	last	decade	with	the	
weakest	fiscal	capacity	among	all	major	
metropolitan	population	centers	in	southern	
Nevada.		
Adding	to	the	diminishing	reputation	of	North	
Las	Vegas	are	widespread	charges	of	fiscal	
mismanagement	by	city	officials.		The	most	
publicized	of	these	charges	targets	overly	
generous	contracts	with	public	employees—
especially	those	in	public	safety.		The	charge	
has	merit.		Las	Vegas	Chamber	of	Commerce	
salary	surveys	demonstrate	that	southern	
Nevada’s	local	city	and	county	workers	are	
among	the	best	compensated	public	
employees	in	the	country.		These	surveys	
illustrate	a	regional	pattern,	suggesting	that	
while	North	Las	Vegas	may	be	a	bit	more	
generous	than	most	other	jurisdictions	it	is	
hardly	an	outlier.		The	problem	is	that	North	
Las	Vegas	has	the	least	fiscal	capacity	to	
sustain	high	wages.			
For	the	region,	the	state,	and	the	nation,	
North	Las	Vegas	is	the	proverbial	“canary	in	
the	coal	mine.”		The	structure	of	North	Las		
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Vegas	government	leaves	it	as	the	most	likely	
to	fail	in	the	face	of	a	deep	recession.		
Although	nearby	jurisdictions	also	suffered	
greatly	in	the	recent	Great	Recession,	they	
possessed	the	capacity	to	manage	fiscal	
shortfalls	and	stay	afloat	during	this	long	
economic	downturn.		
Large	suburban	cities	such	as	North	Las	
Vegas	employ	far	fewer	municipal	workers	
per	capita	than	comparably	sized	traditional	
cities	in	the	Northeast	and	Midwest.	
Geographic	factors	contribute	to	this,	as	most	
Boomburbs	lie	in	the	Sunbelt	where	there	is	a	
tradition	of	contracting	with	private	firms	for	
government	services.		In	addition,	a	large	
share	of	residents	in	Sunbelt	suburban	
cities—from	Coral	Springs,	Florida	to	Irvine,	
California—live	in	master	planned	
communities	that	feature	private	
government.		These	private	governments	
substitute	for	public	ones	and	significantly	
reduce	municipal	tax	burdens.		Former	mayor	
Montandon	in	North	Las	Vegas	intuitively	
understood	this	connection,	as	he	pushed	for	
all	new	growth	to	be	located	in	private	
communities.		The	fact	that	North	Las	Vegas	
still	maintains	a	large	public	space	east	of	
Interstate	15	requires	a	larger	municipal	staff	
than	jurisdictions	where	more	people	live	in	
private	communities.	
The	Fallout:	What	if	North	Las	Vegas	
Fails?	
North	Las	Vegas	could	fail,	and	in	a	highly	
visible	way.		The	damage,	however,	would	not	
be	confined	solely	to	that	city.	The	collateral	
damage	to	the	cities	of	Las	Vegas	and	
Henderson,	and,	most	notably,	the	Las	Vegas	
Strip,	could	be	significant	and	lasting.		The	
first	major	impact	would	be	the	severe	
damage	to	the	reputation	of	the	region’s	
business	climate.		For	years,	Las	Vegas	
benefited	from	its	national	identity	as	the	
fastest	growing	large	U.S.	metropolitan	area.		
Las	Vegas	was	a	growth	machine—the	
newest	big	metropolis	in	America.			
The	Great	Recession,	and	the	crushing	
collapse	of	the	construction	industry	and	the	
home	and	business	foreclosure	crisis	hit		
southern	Nevada	with	unparalleled	force.	
When	the	bust	came,	the	national	media	
descended	on	Las	Vegas	to	document	its	
striking	reversal	of	fortune.		The	once	high‐
flying,	fun‐loving	vacation	and	convention	
destination	was	brought	to	its	knees	by	the	
downturn.		Major	projects	stalled.		City	
Center—the	largest	private	development	in	
U.S.	history,	located	in	the	center	of	the	Las	
Vegas	Strip—teetered	for	a	time	on	the	edge	
of	failure.		The	tale	of	riches‐to‐rags	decline	
spread	so	far	that	many	foreign	news	outlets	
stationed	reporters	in	Las	Vegas	waiting	for	
the	next	shoe	to	fall.		Few	could	have	
imagined	that	the	press	would	compare	the	
region’s	decline	to	that	of	Detroit.		One	
academic	coined	a	term	for	the	condition	Las	
Vegas	now	experienced.		“Sin	City”	was	now	a	
“Sun	Burnt”	city	as	opposed	to	a	Sunbelt	city.		
In	the	past	year	or	so	the	narrative	has	shifted	
as	the	local	and	national	economy	shows	
signs	of	recovery.		A	new	“Las	Vegas	is	Back”	
storyline	has	emerged.		Visitor	figures	
continue	to	grow,	convention	business	is	on	
the	upswing,	and	2012	is	expected	to	be	a	
record	year	for	tourism.			
The	economic	recovery	of	the	Las	Vegas	
region	remains	fragile	and	subject	to	instant	
revision.		The	failure	of	North	Las	Vegas	
would	be	a	visible	reminder	that	the	fallout	
from	the	Great	Recession	continues.		A	new	
“Perhaps	Vegas	is	Not	Back”	storyline	could	
emerge	and	immediately	erase	months	of	
accumulating	positive	news.		The	failure	of	
North	Las	Vegas	could	become	a	metaphor	for	
the	diminished	opportunities	of	the	region	as	
a	whole.		With	226,510	residents,	North	Las	
Vegas	is	now	the	third	largest	city	in	the	state.		
It	is	larger	in	population	than	other	Western	
centers	such	as	Reno,	Boise,	and	Salt	Lake	
City.		North	Las	Vegas	is	nearly	the	size	of	
Orlando	and	surpasses	such	Eastern	urban	
cores	as	Birmingham,	Alabama;	Richmond,	
Virginia;	and	Little	Rock,	Arkansas.			
To	date,	the	biggest	U.S.	city	to	flirt	with	
bankruptcy	is	Stockton,	California,	which	has	
almost	300,000	residents.		Stockton	lies	in	a	
state	with	nearly	38	million	people.		By	
contrast,	Nevada	has	just	2.7	million	
residents.		Only	1	in	every	129	Californians		
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live	in	Stockton,	while	1	in	12	Nevadans	
reside	in	North	Las	Vegas.		Stockton’s	failure	
does	not	equate	to	California’s	failure	writ	
large.		The	city	is	not	the	third	largest	in	the	
state—or	even	the	third	largest	in	the	
California’s	Central	Valley	(it	is	fourth	
largest).		By	contrast,	North	Las	Vegas	at	the	
third	rank	in	Nevada	is	the	equivalent	of	San	
Jose,	California.			
In	short,	the	failure	of	North	Las	Vegas	risks	
becoming	a	public	relations	disaster	for	the	
state.		Even	the	name	“North	Las	Vegas”	is	
problematic.		Many	people	could	mistakenly	
assume	that	Las	Vegas	is	failing—minus	the	
“north.”		The	timing	is	also	bad.		North	Las	
Vegas	could	fail	at	the	very	moment	that	the	
state	launches	its	new	regional	development	
authorities.		Governor	Brain	Sandoval	is	
energetically	promoting	the	launch	of	this	
effort—and	the	results	are	all	positive.		
Reforming	Nevada’s	economic	development	
efforts	has	received	popular	local	and	
national	media	attention.		And	there	are	many	
more	upbeat	stories	the	state	could	promote.		
Some	local	leaders	believe	that	North	Las	
Vegas	should	fail—that	the	city	has	it	coming	
because	of	its	one‐sided	contracts	with	public	
employee	unions.		The	State	of	Nevada,	
however,	has	no	provision	for	a	municipal	
bankruptcy	wherein	a	city	can	simply	renege	
on	municipal	contracts	and	start	over.		The	
process	of	sorting	out	financial	obligations	
would	be	nasty,	messy,	and	very	public.		The	
drama	could	extend	for	weeks	or	even	
months.		Each	story	would	continue	the	main	
sub‐narrative—failure.		North	Las	Vegas	
equals	failure,	or	Las	Vegas	equals	failure,	and	
even	Nevada	equals	failure.		The	risks	here	
are	great	and	the	payoff	small	in	that	
insolvency	does	not	release	the	public	from	
the	city’s	labor	contracts.	
North	Las	Vegas’	financial	insolvency	also	
risks	its	credit	rating.		That	means	the	cost	of	
borrowing	would	go	up	as	the	city’s	
municipal	bond	rating	drops	and	the	interest	
rates	rise.		The	increased	public	cost	of	
infrastructure	would	put	the	city	at	a	distinct	
competitive	disadvantage	for	attracting	new	
residents	and	businesses.			At	first	glance,	this		
would	seem	only	a	local	concern	limited	to	
just	one—albeit	large—municipality.		There	
are	bigger	stakes	at	play.		North	Las	Vegas	
contains	just	over	half	of	the	remaining	
developable	land	in	the	entire	Las	Vegas	
Valley.		By	contrast	Henderson	is	nearly	“built	
out”	as	its	development	pushes	to	the	edge	of	
federal	lands.		The	same	is	true	for	much	of	
the	western	edge	of	the	region	in	places	such	
as	Summerlin.		In	essence,	Las	Vegas’	future	
development	lies	mostly	north,	where	the	last	
sections	of	the	region’s	beltway	are	yet	to	be	
finished.		Hampering	the	development	of	
North	Las	Vegas	by	burdening	it	with	a	high	
cost	of	borrowing	could	significantly	reduce	
the	competitive	position	of	the	entire	Las	
Vegas	Valley.		
The	Path	Forward:	Avoiding	a	Public	
Failure	
The	state	and	city	should	take	actions	to	
prevent	North	Las	Vegas	from	financial	
failure	and	reneging	on	any	of	its	fiscal	
obligations.		A	default	could	result	in	a	
cascading	disaster	that	impacts	the	region’s	
fiscal	capacity	and	business	reputation.		The	
current	estimate	is	that	the	city	will	see	a	$32	
million	short	fall	in	next	year’s	budget	
(beginning	July	1,	2012).	There	is	also	a	
concern	that	the	city	lacks	liquidity	to	meet	
immediate	commitments.		The	discussions	to	
remedy	this	situation	have	concentrated	on	
two	key	areas	for	savings:	union	concessions	
and	service	consolidations.		Yet	there	are	
problems	with	both	approaches.		The	unions	
are	actively	resisting	any	major	concessions	
and	discussions	to	merge	municipal	services	
with	other	jurisdictions	have	broken	down	
(although	there	may	still	be	an	option	for	
merging	the	city	prison).	
Options	that	remain	viable	include	massive	
layoffs	of	public	employees	and	some	cash	
assistance	from	the	state.	City	officials	
recently	approved	a	significant	number	of	
layoffs,	and	this	number	may	grow	depending	
on	how	many	voluntary	retirements	the	city	
can	negotiate	and	the	amount	of	savings	that	
produces.		The	amount	of	direct	resources	
that	Nevada	can	offer	is	limited	but	creative		
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options	are	available.		However,	the	politics	of	
this	assistance	are	also	problematic.		The	
state	cannot	be	seen	as	simply	bailing	out	
North	Las	Vegas.		Critics	will	charge	that	a	
bailout	will	only	encourage	other	localities	to	
act	in	a	profligate	manner	and	then	demand	a	
state	rescue.		Any	state	assistance	needs	to	be	
conditioned	on	specific	reforms	that	reduce	
municipal	expenditures	in	the	future.		While	
the	state	is	certainly	cash	strapped,	it	does	
have	some	modest	resources	available	to	
assist	North	Las	Vegas.		In	fact,	revenue	is	
running	a	bit	ahead	of	estimate	and	the	state	
also	holds	new	resources	that	may	be	
available	to	help	address	this	crisis.	
Nevada	will	receive	tens	of	millions	of	dollars	
as	part	of	a	49	state	$25	billion	settlement	
with	major	banks	in	a	lawsuit	resulting	from	
unlawful	foreclosures.		Approximately	$20	
billion	in	these	funds	will	go	directly	to	
impacted	consumers	in	an	effort	help	avoid	
foreclose.		The	other	$5	billion	will	go	to	the	
states,	with	a	third	of	that	money	targeted	to	
about	750,000	households	that	were	illegally	
foreclosed	on	who	will	now	receive	$2,000	
checks	each.		The	State	of	Nevada	is	slated	to	
receive	$57.4	million	under	the	settlement.		
The	distribution	of	the	money	is	directed	by	
the	state’s	attorney	general,	although	there	is	
nothing	to	prevent	the	money	from	being	
swept	into	Nevada’s	general	fund.		The	
intention	is	to	use	these	resources	to	prevent	
future	foreclosures	via	programs	such	as	
consumer	counseling.		North	Las	Vegas	is	
eligible	for	funding	as	it	is	currently	
structured,	provided	that	the	city	applies	the	
funds	in	specific	programmatic	areas	
determined	by	the	attorney	general.			
There	may	be	some	flexibility	in	helping	the	
city	more	directly.		The	politics	are	dicey,	but	
Nevada	leaders	from	both	parties	have	
demonstrated	a	newfound	willingness	to	
work	together.	The	state’s	new	economic	
development	plan,	Unify,	Regionalize,	
Diversify:	An	Economic	Development	Agenda	
For	Nevada	6,	a	blueprint	for	restructuring	
economic	development	and	diversification	
across	the	state,	is	one	bipartisan	example.	
Nevada	political	leaders	from	both	parties	
could	support	a	plan	to	designate	a	portion	of	
the	funds	noted	for	municipalities	impacted	
by	the	foreclosure	crisis.		The	state	could	also	
leverage	these	funds	by	creating	a	revolving	
loan	fund	to	assist	localities	that	have	cash	
flow	problems.		The	bottom	line	is	that	the	
Nevada’s	leaders	need	to	think	creatively	and	
determine	the	best	use	of	this	windfall	
resource	in	order	to	protect	any	locality	from	
long‐term	economic	failure.		
The	weeks	ahead	are	perilous	for	North	Las	
Vegas	and	the	state.		The	best	case	is	for	both	
to	act	in	cooperation	and	to	be	flexible	in	this	
crisis	in	order	to	avoid	an	actual	economic	
failure.		The	politics	are	difficult.		The	
perception	that	the	city	deserves	to	fail	is	
palpable.		Cooler	heads	must	prevail.		The	
state	can	ill	afford	for	North	Las	Vegas	to	
become	a	symbol	for	an	enduring	decline	in	
Nevada.		That	negative	public	image	is	in	no	
one’s	interest,	including	the	city’s	harshest	
critics.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Page	6	
Footnotes	
1	Lang,	Robert	E.	and	Jennifer	B.	LeFurgy,	Boomburbs:	The	Rise	of	America’s	Accidental	Cities.	
Washington,	DC:	Brookings	Institution	Press,	2007.	3	p.	
2	Orfield,	Maryon,	American	Metropolitics:	The	New	Suburban	Reality.	Washington,	DC:	Brookings	
Institution	Press,	2002.	221	p.	
3	Orfield,	American	Metropolitics,	221	p.	
4	Lang,	Boomburbs,	130	p.	
5	Lang,	Boomburbs,	130	p.	
6	Unify,	Regionalize,	Diversify:	An	Economic	Development	Agenda	for	Nevada.	Metropolitan	Policy	
Program	at	Brookings;	Brookings	Mountain	West;	and	SRI	International,	2011.	176	pp,	
http://www.diversifynevada.com/images/business/Brookings_SRI_‐_Full_report.pdf.	
	
 
	
About	the	Author	
	
Robert	E.	Lang	is	a	Professor	of	Urban	Affairs	at	the	Greenspun	College	of	Urban	Affairs	and	the	
Executive	Director	of	The	Lincy	Institute	at	UNLV.		His	research	areas	and	interests	include	
suburban	studies,	real	estate,	demographic	and	spatial	analysis,	economic	development,	and	
metropolitan	governance.	He	is	the	author	of	the	book	Boomburbs:	the	Rise	of	America’s	Accidental	
Cities	(2007),	published	by	the	Brookings	Institution	Press.	Dr.	Lang’s	newest	book	titled	
Megapolitan	America,	was	published	by	the	American	Planning	Association	in	the	fall	2011.	
	
	
	
Acknowledgments	
	
The	author	wishes	to	thank	William	E.	Brown,	Jr.,	Director	of	Planning	and	Communication,	
Brookings	Mountain	West	for	his	contributions	to	this	brief.	In	addition,	Lucy	Klinkhammer,		
Associate	Vice	President	for	Community	Relations,	The	Lincy	Institute	and	Alexandra	Nikolich,	
Business	Manager,	The	Lincy	Institute	and	Brookings	Mountain	West,	reviewed	and	provided	
feedback	on	drafts	of	this	brief.	
	
	
	
About	UNLV	
	
UNLV,	founded	in	1957,	is	an	institution	of	approximately	27,000	students	and	nearly	2,900	faculty	
and	staff	located	on	the	southern	tip	of	Nevada	minutes	from	the	Las	Vegas	Strip.	Classified	by	the	
Carnegie	Foundation	for	the	Advancement	of	Teaching	as	a	research	university	with	high	research	
activity,	UNLV	offers	more	than	200	undergraduate,	graduate	and	doctoral	degree	programs	
including	innovative	academic	degrees	in	such	fields	as	gaming	management,	entrepreneurship,	
entertainment	engineering	and	much	more.	The	entertainment	capital	of	the	world,	Las	Vegas	
offers	students	a	“living	laboratory”	for	research,	internships,	and	a	wide	variety	of	job	
opportunities.	UNLV	is	dedicated	to	developing	and	supporting	the	human	capital,	regional	
infrastructure,	and	economic	diversification	that	Nevada	needs	for	a	sustainable	future.	For	more	
information,	visit:	http://www.unlv.edu.	
	
	
	
	
	 Page	7	
About	The	Lincy	Institute	
	
Established	in	2009,	The	Lincy	Institute	conducts	and	supports	research	that	focuses	on	improving	
Nevada’s	health,	education,	and	social	services.	This	research	will	be	used	to	build	capacity	for	
service	providers	and	enhance	efforts	to	draw	state	and	federal	money	to	the	greater	Las	Vegas.	
The	Lincy	Institute	will	also	highlight	key	issues	that	affect	public	policy	and	quality‐of‐life	
decisions	on	behalf	of	children,	seniors,	and	families	in	Nevada.	
	
The	Lincy	Institute	has	been	made	possible	by	the	generous	support	of	The	Lincy	Foundation.			
Robert	E.	Lang,	Ph.D.	serves	as	the	Institute’s	Executive	Director.		To	learn	more	visit:			
http://lincyinstitute.unlv.edu/	
	
	
University	of	Nevada,	Las	Vegas	
4505	S.	Maryland	Parkway,	Box	453067	
Las	Vegas,	NV	89154				(702)	895‐0088	
	
	
	
This	information	may	be	used	and	copies	made	for	non‐commercial	purposes.	Proper	attribution	is	required.	
	
For	citation	purposes,	please	use:		Lang,	Robert	E.	(May	2012).	“A	High	Stakes	Gamble	in	North	Las	Vegas.”	
University	of	Nevada,	Las	Vegas	(UNLV),	The	Lincy	Institute.	The	Lincy	Institute	Issues	Brief	No.	1.		
